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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TIIE STATE OF UTAH

GRN1ME,

DENISC R.

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

case No. 15420

ANDRE GRAMME,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiff, Denise R. Gramme, filed an action in
divorce.

Defendant, Andre Gramme, answered and counter-

claimed.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial court found that the plaintiff was
entitled to a divorce against the Defendant and awarded
the Defendant a divorce against the Plaintiff on the
counterclaim.

The Trial court awarded the Plaintiff real

and personal property having a value in excess of
$200,000.00, assessed attorney's fees of $8,000.00, awarded
costs, and required the Defendant to pay, as permanent
alimony,

the sum of $1,400.00 per month.

-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant-Appellant asks the court to
eliminate or reduce the prov1·s1"on for a1·m
l
ony' to modify
the property .:!Wu.rd, and to require thcit the Pl<:lintiffRespondent pay,

from her substantial estate, her own attor-

ney's fees and costs.

The Defendant requests that the

home in Carmel, california, be sold and that the proceeds 0,
placed in trust and professionally managed for the Plain ti:'
STATEMENT OF FACTS
while the court on this appeal may review the
law and the facts,

the Defendant has divided the statemer.t

of Facts in three parts,
financial.

the last of which is entirely

The first section concerns the testimony of

the plaintiff, Denise R. Gramme,

insofar as it is germane

to the issues· raised by the Defendant on appeal.
contained there are not in dispute.
Defendant has included,

The facts

In that section, the

for ease of reference, however, the

third party testimony of Dean R. cal lister,

the arson in-

vestigator of the salt Lake city Fire Department.

The

second section includes the testimony of the Defendant,
Andre Grarrune.
Testimony, Denise R. Gramme
The plaintiff had six years of elementary school
in Belgium and three years of high school for a total of
.
( R. 173) .
nine years formal education

Her employment

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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prior to her marriage was with her father,

in the potato

business, also in Belgium, where she worked sporadically
some Limes "all the we: ck" and sometimes not ut all.
learned, she said,

to buy potatoes and groceries,

She
to bag,

carry and deliver potatoes (R. 174).
The parties were married in 1946 and the plaintiff became immediately pregnant with their only child,
Arlette Gramme Rukavina.

The plaintiff was not employed

until 1949, when, after emigrating to America, she commenced
employment with the Hotel Utah (R. 175), after which she
held a number of different jobs.

Her last employment was

with L. G. Balfour and was for "close to a year" or "maybe
more" (R. 176).
(R.

she was working for Balfour in 1966

177).

Everything,

the plaintiff testified, was perfect,

between she and the Defendant, until he established a
relationship with one Sharon Morecraft in the latter part
of September 1975
to that time,

(R. 167-168).

The plaintiff was, prior

"everything" to the Defendant, she said.

was never ashamed of her,

He

took her out all the time,

spoiled her and dressed and treated her beautifully
(R. 163-164).

she had, however, she admitted, been hospi-

talized between January 15, 1969, and September 4, 1975,
twelve times.

The records show that the enrollments were

frequently for psychological rather than physical reasons
(Exhibit 37-D).

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Plaintiff had a mastectomy in 1969

·
, tor a

malignant tumor and her left breast was removed (R.

2201

Her medical problem was equivalent to that of Mrs. Jake
Happy Rockefeller and Betty Ford (R.

215).

.
c-.

""·

The Plaintiff

later requested the removal of her right breast.

There

was, when it was removed,

The

no hint of malignancy.

plaintiff has never had chemotherapy, or radiation,
medication related to the treatment of cancer.

w

a~

No doctor

has presently advised her that she suffers from cancer
(R.

221), or has in the nine years since 1969 (R. 222).

She is under no current course of treatment for the disease.
The plaintiff had a hysterectomy early in her married life
and has had a bladder problem.
The plaintiff, prior to the trial, had had house·
hold help for ten or twelve years taking care of one half
of a duplex at 692 cortez street in salt Lake city, utah,
where she was home, basically all of the time (R. 214).
The duplex on Cortez street in which the parties lived
from 1953 to late 1975, and where the Defendant continues
to reside, cost less than $10,000.00 to build and the
companion unit rented for $85.00 a month

(R. 169) ·

rn

1975, the parties purchased an expensive home in carmel,
california.
The plaintiff, during the period of her married
life,

had fainting episodes, which sometimes resembled
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convulsions.

The fainting spells preceded, by a consider-

able period,

the surger7 for the removal of the left breast,

and there were many such incidents (R. 182-183).

Mrs. Gramme

did not know how many times she had passed out during the
marriage, whether forty-five or fifty,

to which she had

admitted earlier, or four or five hundred times.

she knew,

however, that it was "many, many, many times" both before
and after her admission for the removal of her left breast
on January 15, 1969 (R. 183).

such seizures never occurred

while she was operating an appliance.

once, she said, one

occurred while she was operating a motor vehicle and twice,
she said,

they occurred in a public place (R. 184-185).

She was never admitted to any hospital for injuries sustained as a result of such circumstances.

ouring the trial,

she appeared, on one occasion, to fall around the witness
box and to the floor

(R. 281).

The plaintiff testified that there was a fire at
her home on July 4, 1972, and another that preceded it

(R. 188-189).

yet a third fire involved a 1970 Pontiac

owned by the parties and was caused by arson (R. 192).

A

fourth fire at the Gramme residence involved a boat owned
by the Plaintiff's father which was stored in the carport
at the plaintiff's home while the father was in Europe.
It burned the boat, damaged a camper, a truck and the carport (See Exhibits 47-o to 50-o) and caused extensive damage (R. 195).
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The Plaintiff ad;nitced that a :-iei,=:hi)or :;ir~ ,_
accused her of setting ~ fire,
(R.

197).

Knolte

to be an

e~:e\·1:.. ::.~:::

She indicated that the witnesses :-iame

(R. 198), and that,

on fire

cl~iming

(R. 199).

later,

Mrs. Gramme,

the Knolte home ca~:;:,:

in connection with :::e

accusation, spoke to the "fire chief" at his office bu:
testified,

at first

(R.

201-202),

that it was not che Fi:;

Department, but the Defendant who required her co see
psychiatrist

(R.

201).

She denied she was ever asked :c :;

a lie detector test concerning these events, and ther.
(R.

202).

Dean P. Callister, a Lieutenant in the Salt
City Fire Department,

L~!

the fire arson investigator, tes'.:i·

fied from Fire Department records

(R. 483),

that he was

familiar with the parties and had been called to their he:.!
at 692 Cortez street to investigate fires on six separate
occasions between -"'lay of 197 3, and June of 1974.
involved, among other things,
boat,

a garage,

truck and camper, and a grass fire

The'; ~,a:

a fence, a :::aqor:,
(R. 482).

.:..f:er'

number of visits to examine the aftermath of fires belie"·":
to have been caused by arson, without being able, from tr.e
evidence,

to prove guilt,

the Lieutenant was called to

speak with "two witnesses" who informed him "they had
observed Mrs. Gramme" set a fire

(R. 488).

After speak:.~=

with the county Attorney, who advised him to speak with:::
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r;ra;:-Ll!leS,

:ie informed them,

he said, on June 25, 1974, that

:hey ~ust obtain care fer the Plaintiff or that the cepart~c~t

would file criminal charges against her (R. 489).

sieucenant callisccr later confirmed that

th~

plaintiff

was, pursuant to his instructions, receiving psychiatric
:are (R. 490).

The fire in June of 1974, was the last one

:r.e Fire Department was called to investigate at the Plain:iff' s home

(R. 488).

The plaintiff, at the time, was

admitted co the psychiatric ward at St. _:,rark's Hospital
(R.

272).

On three or four occasions, windows were broken at
Cortez Street

(R.

ry was stolen.

202).

The home was burglarized and jewel-

The Defendant's office was ransacked "two"

or "three" times, and his papers and documents were thrown
aro1.lnd (R. 203).

The Police, as distinguished from the Fire

Jepartment, came to the parties home at least two or three
times (R.

204).

All of the events described preceded the

relationship of the Defendant with Mrs. Morecraft (R. 206).
The Plaintiff had used drugs, she said, regularly,
since 1969.

They cost her, over nine years, $60.00 to

$70.00 per month,

"sometimes more, sometimes less" (R. 207).

The drugs included valium,. Fiornal and Diuril (R. 208).
water pills, and also, Thorazine and Equamil (R. 291).

The

Plaintiff overdosed on drugs and when asked how often,
responded as follows:
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"Well, my husband told me every
time I took those pills he took me
down to the h<::lspital, and r recall
three or four times, maybe six times
I don't know.
Maybe three or four o~
five times, I guess" (R. 209).
some of the drug overdoses w0re,
suicide attempts
missions,

(R.

in reality,

210), and of the twelve hospital ad-

for every purpose,

from January of 1969,

surgical and psychological,

to September of 1975, all, again,

were prior to the relationship of the Defendant with sharor,
Morecraft

(R. 211,

Exhibit 37-o).

Prior to the Defendant's

friendship with Sharon Morecraft,

in late 1975, the Plain-

tiff admitted that she had never complained that her husbar.d,
Andre Gramme,

~

any part of her problem (R. 213-214). rhe

psychiatrist noted on July 11, 1974, on the occasion of
the plaintiff's tenth admission to St. Mark's Hospital, tha:
her social history was "insignificant"
July 11,

1974 admission,

(Exhibit 37-D,

emphasis supplied).

The plaintiff physically assaulted Sharon Morecraft at the airport

(R.

231-232),

in 1975 or 1976, beating

her with a club she had brought from home, which was broken
on Mrs. Morecraft's bac k

( R.

232 - 235) .

The Pl aintiff admit·

ted that the Defendant sai· d " .•. h e was scared of me," and
that he slept in the bathroom, behind the locked door,
"many, many, many times"

(R.

236).

The plaintiff was accused of theft (R. 297) in
carmel, California,

in early 1977,

involving expensive
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jewelry stolen from the home of Dr. and Mrs. Hall, who were
friends.
a robbery,
1

rt was the Plaintiff who notified the police of
ostensibly in process.

There were, again, broken

1indows, and the jewelry was found,

plaintiff's carmel home.

after a search, in the

The Plaintiff plcd guilty to a

misdemeanor and was placed on probation.

She was on proba-

tion in California at the time of the trial (R. 297-303).
Testimony, Andre Granune
The parties were married in July of 1946.

Mrs.

Grarrune was first employed in late 1949 or early 1950 and
last worked in 1967 (R. 409), when her income was $1,352.85
(R. 412).

She had no incomP- in 1968, none since 1968, and

worked sporadically,

perha~s

half the time, from 1949 to

1967 (R. 414-415).
The plaintiff left the Defendant, and her infant
daughter, early in the marriage (R. 420), for some ten
days for another man (R. 421).
said,

The Plaintiff, the Defendant

had a bad temper and was both nervous and loud.
The plaintiff had, during the period of the mar-

riage, and before 1969,

"hundreds" of fainting incidents,

which were, said the Defendant,

"too numerous to count"

(R. 421).

the Defendant said, lapse

The plaintiff would,

to the floor or fall on a couch.

The Defendant never knew

the Plaintiff to fall against a piece of furniture, or to
hurt herself, and she was never hospitalized by reason of the

-9-
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incidents.

The Defendant had never known sue h an event :c

occur when the Plainti£f was operating an appliance,
bathlub (R. 422),

in an automobile,

or at ca ny pu b lie place

NO doctor ever found an explanation for sucli incidents,
·
·
"'
for the variant that more nearly resembled a t ype of conv'l.·
sion (R. 423).

The incident in the witness box,

dur~g~

trial, was the first such incident the Defendant ever observed to occur in a public place.

After the Fire oepart-

men t required the Plaintiff to see a psychiatrist, there
were,

said the Defendant, no more convulsions (R. 424).
·The plaintiff was a regular drug user, and began

taking them as early as 1949 or 1950.
ing pills and tranquilizers

(R.

425) .

They included sleepThe use increased

in number and variety after 1969 and those for which payment was made by check cost between $60.00 and $80.00 a
month,

from then until the time of trial.

As early as 19iO

the plaintiff overdosed, on one occasion after an argument
with her father

(R. 426).

she did it on several subsequent

occasions and was hospitalized.

on several occasions hu

stomach was pumped at st. Mark's Hospital (R. 427).
The plaintiff,

the Defendant testified, confined

herself'

for a number of years'

health.

she stayed at home with the drapes pulled, the

doors locked,

the blinds drawn,

to the consideration of her

failing to dress during the

day and watching the soap operas on TV.

She did not assis:
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in the business

(R. 427-428), manage the household accounts

(R· 467), keep or maintain the duplex and she was, the
oefendant testified, often up at night (R. 428).
The Plaintiff was not pleased with the home at
corLcz and wanLed to move to a larger home in rrolladay
(R. 429).

she had wanted, she testified, to move from the

duplex to a better place and she had discussed such a move
with the Defendant over a period of many years (R. 170).
There were, at Cortez, a "rash" of broken windows.

on one

occasion a detective asked the Defendant if the plaintiff
would take a lie detector test.

rn connection with such

events, the Plaintiff suggested that the parties move, asserting that someone didn't like them and that they must
have "enemies"

(R. 430).

After one of the ransacking incidents at the home,
the Defendant observed the plaintiff remove money from his
wallet (R. 431).

The police Department came to the house

in connection with the broken windows, and the ransackings,
four or five times (R. 432).

The plaintiff refused to take

the lie detector test on the basis, she said, of medical
advice (R. 432-433).
There were four separate fires in the home, at
Cortez (R. 433).

All began in the carport.

The second

occurred on the 4th of July when the Defendant went, over
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objection,

to a party without the Plaintiff, who then ca'.·

to inform him that the qarage was on fire

(R. 434).

The third incident involved the burning of a
1970 Pontiac.

The De fcndun t was awakened by the Plaint,::

who preceded him outside and who pulled from the
a rope or a rag that operated as a fuse

gas

(R. 435).

tan~.

The

Defendant found matches at the scene and was told by the
Plaintiff, who admitted they were there,

that it was ~rt

and that she had lit the matches to see what was going on.
Before the fire,

the Plaintiff had asked that the parties

purchase another car, a request that the Defendant had re·
fused

(R. 437).

The Fire Department investigated, and cor.·

eluded that the fire was caused by arson (R. 437).
In 1973 or 1974,

the Plaintiff wanted to travel

with her parents to Europe to visit an aunt who was dying
(R. 437), and her parents refused to permit her to accom·
pany them.

During the trip,

the father, Mr. Hasoppe,

stored his boat at Cortez street in the carport.
fendant,

The De·

one evening, waked, after an explosion, to find

the boat on fire and his wife on the-couch in the livi~
room.

The fire,

which spread, engulfed the carport, a

truck and its contents,

items of storage, as well as the

boat and all were destroyed or damaged, reflecting a total
loss of approximately $10,000.00 (R. 739), equivalent~
the original cost for the construction of the entire dupl::

-12-
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rhe Fire Department determined that the fire was caused

by arson (R. 440).
on curtcz

It was the fourth fire at the duplex

str~ct.

Th'-'rc w'-'rc,

in <..tddition to the fires at the home

of the parties, other fires in the neighborhood.

Two of

them involved fences, one a grapestake, between the home
of neighbors to the north,

the Knolte's, and the home of

the parties to these proceedings (R. 441).

One of them

also involved a clutch of bamboo which the plaintiff had
complained blew dry leaves on the parties' property in the
late fall or early winter

(R. 441-442).

on another occasion

the Defendant was awakened by the Fire Department which had
extinguished a grass fire.

It was at that time, that the

setting of the fire,

by the Plaintiff, was witnessed by

neighbors (R. 442).

Later there was at the home of the

Knolte's,

the parents of one of the witnesses, though they

no longer lived at the premises, also a fire (R. 443).
The parties were summoned to the Fire Department
(R. 443) and told by the arson investigator that there was
enough evidence to press charges against the Plaintiff unless she had psychiatric treatment (R. 444).

The Plaintiff

was enrolled at the psychiatric ward at st. Mark's Hospital
on two separate and subsequent occasions, once after an
overdose (R. 445) on the request of Dr. Peterson, and once
•Jpon the request of the family physician, Dr. Dalyrymple,
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"for a total period of approximately two weeks
A second psychiatrist

r~commended

a

the filing of the criminal charoes
in
~
to the filing of this lawsuit.

~a1i=orr·~

--

_.....

··---,

__ .

.:::i'... ::s::~.~·

The Pl.ai:1t:i~£ re::.isei

admitted (R. 446-448).
:~,

The Defendant testified that the condu.ct of
Plaintiff impaired their social relationships (R. 452,

:.~:

on one occasion, he found her in a closed garage, :..::
trur..k of the car, with its motor running
taken, again,

(R. 4531.

to the emergency room at st. Mark's

s~e

'"

5:tos~n:a:

Twice the Defendant found the plaintiff standing over

~u

bed with a knife in her hand (R. 454) , and once he four.d
her wandering around the house, after an argi.:men'::, wit'.1 a
rifle,

cocked, a shell in the chamber, and •.nth the sa:e:

off (R. 455) .

The Defendant also testified that because

he was afraid of the plaintiff,

he would lock himself i;.

the bathroom ar..d sleep on the floor.

He believed, he sa::

that the plaintiff was capable of physical violence (R. •::
He observed the plaintiff hit Mrs. Morecraft with a brae~·
stick, beat her with her hands and throw her luggage ai: ::;
airport

(R. 456).

on a morning after the plaintiff had

physically attempted to gain ingress to the Defendant's
apartment,

the Defendant was advised that a corvair auto·

mobile dri,ren by Mrs. Morecraft,

had been damaged by so!l:ec:'

who had apparently struck the vehicle with a rock, scrat:::
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;lass
.=:.::e .::.:;er:

:'..

o:-.

a

-l-56).

··~r:: r·:;la::.o:-.ship of c.he Jcf~r.da:-:t '.Vi1:h ~·!rs. ~lore
~..-'.::--

·..;as ~~o:.,

:::s::.r~c

:.~-.e.

". . .+581.

::'2£2r..dar:.~

~estif.i.ed,

secr·2::. or ::lan-

Tr.c Defendant admitted he knew Sharon

c·'.or:ecraf::, that he had a relationship with her which began
•.

::.e:;c

~c

•.?- •

·:if 1975
.+·J1'

(R. 102) and that they had been to san

to san carlos, :-1exico,

~[azatlan,

o.r.i c:ar:rel, califor:na (R. 531 together (R. 41).

~exico

He admit-

:ed tha:: c·lr:S. c·lorecraft worked for him in his office (R. 42),

::'.at: :ie had given her gifts, and had seen her frequently,
~ot'.1

prior ::o and after his separation from the Plaintiff

(:.:<. 46)

in September of 1976 (R. 47).

He stated that the

?lainciff was in California quite a bit of the time, just
?rior to their separation (R. 49).
The Plaintiff, the Defendant testified, was a
?OOr manager of money; and, at times, during the period of
'.:er

emplo~·ment,

her clothing purchases were virtually equiv-

alent ::o her income.
;fter

t~e

Her tastes were expensive (R. 469).

separation of the parties, the Plaintiff, though

the recipient of adequate temporary alimony, failed to pay
~er

bills in timely fashion,

including telephone, garbage

?ic:-:up, soft water, cable TV and water (R. 477).
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Financial Affairs
The Defendant.,

a masonry contractor, testified

that all of his carninss from every source had come to res:
in his personal assets,

as reflected in the exhibit, 34 _ ,
0

(R. 105-106) and in the value of his corporation, which he
testified was,
which,

as of December 31, 1976, $120,000.00, and

he testified, had diminished in view of his losses

during the year 1977

(R. 501).

The Defendant failed to

answer several questions pertaining to his income, his purchases,

and to the accumulations in his estate

prior~~:

He did so on the basis of the privilege against self incric·
ination.

The questions and the objections are on the recor'

at 85, 86, 89 and 90.
who had,

The parties accountant, Mr. Bayes,

for many years, prepared their joint returns,

testified that he knew of no other assets
essentially,

the plaintiff.

(R. 545), as did,

There were several items whid

the Defendant admitted in final argument (R. 621) might
operate to increase the figure on Exhibit 34-D, slightly.

1

The Trial court found the value of the personal assets to
be $439,200.00, and valued the corporation at $210,800.00
(Find in gs, R . at 124) .

That was some $ 90, 000. 00 more than

1.
rncluding $1, 700.00 for improvements at 1815 west SOO
south, $1,400.00 for the cash value of the policy.of ~l~
insurance with Northwestern, and a oatsun automobile
at $2,500.00.
(see:
Final Argument at 620-621.)
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it was valued by its accountant (R. 555), or by the Defendant, without considering the loss8s incurred in the year
1977.

The Defendant, who testified at the trial that
the position of the corporation, Andre Gramme Masonry, rnc.,
was "very precarious," said that he had borrowed $160,000.00,
some of which was secured by savings certificates, to secure
operating capital, cash flow,

for the business (R. 493-495).

The Defendant also presented a projection of the project
at Little America,

showing an estimated loss of $120,000.00

(R. 497), and other projected losses that raised the
anticipated shortfall for 1977 to $150,000.00 (R. 501).
The Defendant stood behind his tax returns that reflected
a loss in 1976

(R. 501).

The valuation placed on the corporation by the
Plaintiff's expert was exorbitant (R. 314).

The Trial

court did not authenticate the expert's findings and
expressly refused to award the Plaintiff a fee for the
expert's services.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT MISUNDERSTOOD AND MISAPPLIED THE LAW
A.

The court Below Did Not consider the Mis-

conduct of the plaintiff Wife.
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The Trial court :::onsistently resisted c:::s :c·--:.:

sideration of the facts. relating t:o the misconduct
'.vife,

a::·,

treating the case as one involving merel/ ~:ic; a::.:·.

mcnt of economic filccors.

The problem surfaced

off the record, before the trial began. 2
counsel requested,

Defendant's

first in chambers, during the course c:

the trial, and then in open court,

that the court arc 1 :·;.

late its position on the record (R. 526-528).
Defendant's counsel interrogated the Plainti::
relative to several actual or attempted physical assaub
by the plaintiff on Mrs. Morecraft and members of the
plaintiff's family.

The questions were asked on cross-

examination, and the first question in the series began a:
line 3 on page 231.

Objections were interposed to a

foundational question which began at line 11 on page

2.

~O.

"MR. ALLRED

Mrs. Gramme, you were
on the outs with your
father for a period of
some years, were you not,
before his death (R. 240)?

MR. MC LACHIJl.N :

your Honor, I will object
to this line of questionir.g.
I can't see any relevance.

THE COURT:

objection is sustained.

MR. ALLRED:

okay. Mrs. Gramme, were
you excluded from your
father's room at the hospital?

where the court invited objections to such testimony.
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MR. ;•!C U\CHLAN:

Your Honor- -

THE WITNi:SS: ·

Never, Sir.

:'!R.

Y!C LACHLAN :

Your Honor- -

t-!R.

)\LLRED:

I'm laying the groundwork,
Your Honor, for the attack
that I have just mentioned.

THE COURT:
~1R

.

ALLRED :

All right. Suppose you
show the attack?
Excuse me?

THE COURT:

suppose you show that?
What then? what does it
prove so far as this case
is concerned?

MR. AL:!:.,RED:

The conduct of the wife,
Your Honor, the misconduct
of the wife.

THE COURT:

Objection is sustained ... "
(R. 240-241)
(Emphasis
supplied.)

Then followed a lengthy legal argument.
that argument,
MR.

During

the following discussion was had.
ALLRED:

THE COURT:

" ... But r'm not trying to
confine myself to misconduct
of recent origin (R. 244).
well r'm going to confine
misconduct to recent origin,
and in that regard, recommend
strongly you read English v
English,3 which was decided
by the utah supreme court
.on June 2nd, 1977.

3. Where this court addressed itself to economic considerations.
English v. English ~utah, ·1977), 565 P.2d
409.
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:'<IR. ALLRED :

have read it, Your Ho~o"
h~ve got a photocopy i:c-·
my rile.
I

I

THE COURT:

Does that tell vou an]'thi~.:
about what the issues ir. this case are?"
(R. ~44
emphasis supplied)4
'

In that dialogue,

the court ha s sai·d , indirec::
·

on the record, what it had said, more directly, in chamber;
Al'imony,

the court reasoned, was to be determined witJ

reference to the economic factors and was,
case,

in the insta:ic

in its entirety, an economic judgment.
That that was the position of the Trial court

is apparent in the dialogue between the court and Defend·
ant's counsel

(R.

240-268).

The court sustained the

objection to the question with which the dialogue began,
relying,

it said, on the "precise language"

(R.

268) of

Anderson v. Anderson 18 utah 2d 286, 422 P.2d 192, which
it claimed supported the proposition that grounds for

4.
Misconduct was not at issue in the English case, as
the plaintiff-Respondent noted in her brief.
"In the
instant matter there is nothing that reflects upon the
morality of either party ..• "
(Respondent's Brief, page 19
rn English this court cited as central to its deliberations on the issue of alimony, Hendricks v. Hendricks
91 utah 553, 63 p.2d 277, a 1936 utah case that prec~~
Alldredge v. Alldredge 119 Utah 504, 229 p.2d 681'. _by
some fifteen years in time.
The English case mod1ned
and reduced the alimony awarded by the Trial court.

-20-
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divorce having been established,

the degree of fault was

of no further concern to the Trial Judge. 5
The Trial court articulated its position, first,
in the context of a quote from the Anderson case, stating

"Thus it affirmatively appears that
he (th~ Trial Judge in the Anderson case)
did not penalize the Plaintiff in that
regard, but considered the various factors bearing upon their financial situation and an equitable solution to the
problems presented by the attorneys"
(R. 268-269).
and then Judge Hanson put the matter, in perspective, in
his own words, as follows:

5. rn the Anderson case, the Trial court agreed to be
bound by a stipulation. The arrangement w~s reflected in
the brief on appeal as follows:
"The parties stipulated that the
court would consider the division of the
property without in any way consider~
the question ~ grounds of divorce £E_
who was responsible, to which the court
stated that it thought this was a wholesome way of handling the matter (R. 54)"
(Appellant's Brief, page 5, emphasis
supplied).
The Appellant urged on the Anderson appeal that the Trial
court disregarded the stipulation and considered marital
fault and misconduct in making its award. This court said
that the Trial court in Anderson did not disregard the
arrangement of the parties. The Trial court, in the instant
case, took the language of this court in the Anderson case,
out of context, failing to consider the effect of the ,
Stipulation, and erroneously assumed, as a general proposition, that once grounds for divorce were established,
the degree of fault was of no further concern.
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"WHICII I THINK REFLECTS THE LAW
OF THIS STATE AS FURTHER SET FORTH
IN THE CASE (English v. English, supra
R. at 241) I WAS REFERRING TO EARLIER°
'l'fHS MORNING" (R. 269, emphasis
supplied) .
The court permitted, begrudgingly, testimony
concerning the Plaintiff's misconduct during the marriage,
but clearly, as the preceding quote indicates, did not
consider it on the issue of alimony, and permitted its
admission for the limited purpose of cross-examination,
or confined it to the issue of grounds. 6
B.

The Position of the Trial court Did Not

correctly Reflect the Law of the state of Utah.
courts justify the award of permanent alimony
on differing theories.

some take the position that it is

in the nature of compensation for the wrong and injury a
wife has suffered by reason of her husband's misconduct.

EX parte Spencer 83 cal. 460, 23 P. 395.
Am Jur 2d,

see also:

M

"Divorce and separation," § 601, p. 725.

The

generally accepted view,

however,

is that the function of

permanent alimony is to provide support for the wife.
strictly speaking, permanent alimony is not based upon the
obligation of support, since the dissolution of the

6.
see instances on the record, line 1 page 419 to line
3 page 240, line 15 to line 23 at page 281. line B to
line 11 at page 451, line 15 to line 17 at page 454.
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marriage by the final decr2e terminates such obligation.
Rather, it is a substi~ute for the right of support.
where the court has the power to award permanent
alimony,

the question whether it should be allowed in the

particular case is a matter of sound judicial discretion
to be exercised with reference to established principles
and upon a view of all the circumstances of the particular
7
case.
Stefonick v. Stefanick 118 Mont. 486, 167 P.2d 848,
Bishop v. Bishop 194 Okla. 209, 148 P.2d 472, 155 ALR 604,
Miles v. Miles 185 or. 230, 202 P.2d 485.

A wife is never

entitled to alimony as a matter of course.

Vig:il v. vis:il

49 Colo. 156, 111 P. 833, Tobin v. Tobin 89 Okla. 12,
213 p. 884.

Alimony is usually, but not necessarily,

awarded to the wife when she is granted a divorce.

where

a divorce is granted to both parties, alimony may be

7. Assuming the existence of the power to award alimony
to a wife for whose misconduct a divorce is granted, the
nature of her conduct is a factor which is taken into
account in determining whether to make an award. see:
Annotation: 34 ALR 2d 345, section 11, citing in support
Macoonald v. MacDonald 120 utah 573, 263 P.2d 1066.
"The power to award alimony to the
guilty wife is addressed to the discretion
of the courts and should be exercised with
great care, and it should not be exercised
in favor of the wife where there are no
mitigating circumstances." 24 Arn Jur 2d,
"Divorce and separation," section 621
p. 743. see also: Ecker v. Ecker 22 Okla.
873, 98 P. 918.
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awarded either,

for the ba sis
·
o f i·iability

modification in Utah,

is the gran~i·ng

o

f

the person required to pay it. 8
Ordinarily,

there can be no L
· iJ· '

'

sub

J ec t to som,

a divorce aga.ms:

'·"'11ce Of

perman-

ent alimony where a Decree of divorce is denied.
Peyre 79 cal. 336,

21 p. 838.

The nat ure o f t h e conduct

of the wife is a factor which is taken in to account in
determining whether to make an award of alimony.9
tion:

34 ALR 345, section 11.

-

Annota-

The rule at corrunon law, as Justice Wolfe noted
in Alldredge v. Alldredge 119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681,
"denied alimony to the wife at fault."

8.

The Utah Rule is widely believed to be as follows:
" •.. in considering the equities upon
granting a divorce to the husband, if the
court finds that the wife has been guilty
of gross or prolonged irrunoral conduct, an
award of alimony to the wife may be denied
in most cases." Alldredge v Alldredge
119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681.

see 24 Am Jur 2d, "Divorce and separation," section 621,
page 744, footnote.
see also: Annotation, 34 ALR 2d 345,
Headnote 7 on page 306.
9.
And indeed the fact that a wife who is granted a
divorce was not free from fault is always an important
factor to be taken into consideration in fixing the amount
of alimony.
see: Annotation 9 ALR 2d 1029, section 3.
I f the wife is free from blame, the allowance will be
greater than if her conduct was conducive to her hus b an d's
fault.
see: Annotation:
1 ALR 3d 143, section 6.
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In Alldredge,

the wife permitted juvenile de-

linquents and older persons of questionable character to
come to the home.

They drank intoxicating liquors, smoked

cigarettes and played cards over the repeated objections
of the husband.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant had a

thirty-seven year marriage and eleven children, ten of
whom survived.

The court concluded that the misconduct was

of only recent origin and that it constituted cruelty which
did not rise to the level of gross misconduct.
conduct did not,

The mis-

the court determined, involve moral

turpitude.
On those difficult facts,

this court, under its

equitable powers, accepted what it called a more modern
rule.

The court should consider all the circumstances, it

said, and withhold or decree alimony and distribute property in accordance with those circumstances.
case is widely cited,

The Alldredge

is regarded as the applicable Utah

Law by national commentators (see footnote #8) and is the
lead case in the annotation found at 34 ALR 2d 305.
Under the Alldredge rule,
law was modified.

the rule at common

under the Alldredge rule, a wife of long

standing did not forfeit all right to alimony or all
right to a share in the property because of:
1.

Recent misconduct.

-25-
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2.

Nor in cases where the husband may have

been equally at fault. ·
3.

Nor in cases where there was a doubtful

preponderance aguinst the wife.
The clear nccrative
implicati· 011 of ti'.e All drc~
~
case,

however, was that a wife might lose part of her

right

to property or alimony in each of the three separate
situations to which reference is above made.
"Under this rule, the wife of long
standing does not forfeit ALL right to
alimony or a share in the propert·y because of ... "
(Emphasis supplied)
counsel argues that, at its heart, the

Alldr~~

case, and subsequent Utah cases, still acknowledge the
underlying validity of the rule at common law, the rule
in a majority of jurisdictions.
"Perhaps such a forfeiture of
alimony may not be out of proportion
in the case where a young wife guilty
of acts of moral turpitude, has opportunity to start life anew but in a
case such as this it would be all out
of proportion" (Alldredge v. Alldredge,
supra at 685).
The award, extent and duration of alimony is an
economic judgment that must consider the needs of the wife
and the ability of the husband to pay, and a great number
of other circumstances.

10

rt is not, however, as the

10. Macoonald v. MacDonald 120 Utah 573, 263 p.2d
1066.
-26-
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Trial court concluded, merely an economic judgment.

There

are factors beyond the economics of the termination, which
relate to the granting of such an award, its amount and
duration, and to the right of the wife to claim such a
benefit as an incident of the marriage.
c.

The Relative Guilt of the Parties is a

factor to be considered in Awarding Alimony.
It is a serious conceptual mistake to presume
that the wife is entitled to alimony, a claim on the husband's future income, whatever her conduct, and however
it may have contributed to the destruction of the marriage.
The Utah rule, as it is stated in the annotation
at 34 ALR 2d 305, is said to be as follows:
"Although the statute is broad
enough to give the court the power to
award permanent alimony to a wife against
whom a divorce is granted, it is generally
held that in determining whether to exercise the power in a particular case the
court should consider the nature of the
wife's misconduct." Citing: MacDonald v.
Macoonald 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066.
(Emphasis supplied)
And the rule in Alldredge, which the Trial court
chose to disregard, was that,
"In considering these equities
if the"""""Court finds thatthe wife has
been guII"t"'.{of grossor prolonged-ImiiiOral conduct~ward of alimony
may in most casesbedenied."
(Emphasis
supplie~ ~~~ -

-27Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The standard applied in Utah to determine whetr.e:
alimony is appropriate,· and in what amount,

is a flexible
standard, which has, as a practical matter, much
wisdom.
In Wilson v. Wilson 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d
(1956),

977

this court stated,
"We recognize that there is no
authority in our law for administering
punitive measures in a divorce judgment,
and that to do so would be improper.
except that the court may, and as a
practical matter invariably does consider
the relative loyalty or disloyalty of the
parties to their marriage vows, and their
relative guilt or innocence in causing
the break-up of the marriage."
The court then, speaking of alimony, cites the

principle that was later recited, per curiam, in Anderson
Anderson 18 Utah 2d 286, 422 P.2d 192,

·1.

(1967) stating as

follows:
"The court's responsibility is to
endeavor to provide a just and equitable
adjustment of their economic resources
so that the parties can reconstruct
their lives on a happy and useful basis.
rn doing so it is necessary for the court
to consider in addition to the relative
guilt or innocence of the-parties, an
appraisal of all 0£---rhe-attend~nt facts
and circumstances ... "
(Emphasis supplied)
see also:

Wilson v. Wilson 5 utah 2d 79, 296 p.l~

977, Pinion v. Pinion 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265, Allenv.
Allen 109 utah 99, 165 P. 2d 872, Searle v. Searle (Utah,
1974) 522 P.2d 697.
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The Trial court and Plaintiff's counsel presumed
~hat

the length of the marriage made alimony, substantial

permanent alimony, automatic, notwithstanding the Plaintiff',; conduct, and notwithstanding the inm1ense award of
property made to the Plaintiff from the marital estate under
the terms and conditions of the generous Decree.
In Christensen v. Christensen 21 Utah 2d 263,

444 p.2d 511 (1968),

the Plaintiff and the Defendant had

been married for twenty-five years and neither party was
free from fault with respect to the marriage.

The Trial

Judge, for that, within the purview of his powers, awarded
the divorce to the Plaintiff husband and provided for a
lump sum of alimony, $2,400.00, payable at the husband's
option over two years.

The wife appealed and urged that

"Even if there be fault

~

frailty on the part of the

wife, the court should keep in mind that if she is placed

in too serious an economic disadvantage, she may become
dependent upon others or the public which should be avoided."
Justice Crockett, speaking for a unanimous court, responded
as follows:
"Defendant's argument, carried to
its conclusion, would mean that whenever
a marriage has lasted for any considerable
number of years, the wife would always
be entitled to permanent alimony. we do
not regard that as the law.
Nor did we
so intend by the statement in the MacDonald
case ... "

-29-
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The position of the Appellants in the

~

case was that the Court., on appeal, should concentrat

e

Or.

the economic factors to the exclusion of "fault or frail:
That this court, which refused to increase the award to
the Defendant-Appellant, did not share that conception.
is indicated in the following language.
"As indicated therein, (Macoonald)
it (duration of marriage) is one of
the factors to be considered with all of
the others in making the adjustment
which the court deems just and equitable
between the parties. This is also true
of the relative guilt, or perhaps hetter
stated, the greater responsibility one
spouse may appear to have than the other
for bringing about the failure of the
marriage."
o.

The Trial court Abused rts Discretion.

There is a distinction between the division of
assets accumulated during the marriage, which should be
distributed on an equitable basis,
duty of support and maintenance.

11

and the postmarital

Alimony is a perpetual

lien on the husband's future income, income acquired in
the absence of the wife and without her assistance.
"The question whether permanent
alimony shall be allowed is addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial
court, and a principal reason why the
court has such a discretion is that
there are several factors which may
justify it in denying alimony altcigether,

11. where the wife assisted in the accumulation, either
directly or indirectly.
-30-
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such as the misconduct of the wife
tile-financial condition--Of"-the parties,
and contractual agreements between the
parties regarding alimony." Se8:
24 Am
,Jur 2u, "Divorce and separation," section
618, page 740 (Emphasis supplied).
The Trial court permitted no independent evidence from those who knew, relating to marital fault or
misconduct.

The evidence the court heard on the issue of

misconduct, was received because it was not objected to,
because the subject matter was opened on direct by Plaintiff's own counsel or because, in the Trial court's opinion,
it related to grounds.
The Trial court considered economic factors and
excluded considerations of marital fault and misconduct.
And, it made the assumption that the law of this jurisdiction required such emphasis and such exclusion.

In

determining then, whether permanent alimony should be
allowed, and also,

if so, its extent and duration; in exer-

cising, in other words, its discretion in that regard, the
court did not consider the factors required to invoke such
a discretion in the first instance.
"The nature of the misconduct of
the wife is for consideration as an aid
to judicial discretion in deciding
whether the wife should have alimony on
12
divorce, and, if so, the amount thereof."

12. Alldredge, supra at 685, citing cronin v. cronin
245 Ala.309, 16 SQ.2d 714.

-31-
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The Trial court abused its discretion.

It ,,,1as

induced to do so by a misapprehension of the law.
court will disturb the findings of the Trial court,
its judgment, where it has abused its discret:i.'on or
applied principles of law.

(Utah,

and

mis-

Eastman v. Eastman (Utah,

558 p.2d 514, carter v. carter (Utah,
Watson v. watson

This

1977)

197

,

1977) 563 P.2d l77,

561 P.2d 1072.

POINT I I
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED THE TESTIMONY OF DEF::;:.
ANT'S WITNESSES.
The Trial court excluded the testimony of Andre
George, Manny Hasoppe and Arlette Rukavina.

They were

the sister, brother and daughter of the Plaintiff, respec·
tively.

All were to testify in behalf of the Defendant,

Andre Gramme.

The Trial court, which indulged every liber·

ality respecting the financial witnesses, permitted no
13 '
'
independent testimony concerning
t h e mar:i.' ta 1 f acts.
Jc
heard,

relative to such matters,

from the plaintiff and

the Defendant, exclusively.
The exclusion of testimony basic to the Defend·
ant's case was supported,

the Trial court claimed, by t~

provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Evidence (R. 528, 53 4

13.
The court reluctantly permitted testimony from oe:~/·
cal lister, the chief arson investigator for the salt L
City Fire Department (R. 482).

-32Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~he cestimony,

the court argued, would be cumulative or

corroborative and would·necessitate an undue consumption
of time.

It would create a substantial danger of impair-

ing relationships buyond those that existed between the
plaintiff and the Defendant,

14

and the probative value of

such testimony was outweighed, it said, by those factors
(R. 528,

529).

rn a case involving hundreds of thousands of
dollars,

the Trial court listened to the partisans and

rejected the independent testimony of those who knew the
principals best.

Mrs. George was the only sister of the

plaintiff, and Mr. Hasoppe the only brother.

Mrs. Rukavina

v1as the adult daughter and only child of the parties to
these proceedings.

All were familiar with facts germane

co the litigation.ls

14. While excluding the evidence professing concern that
the testimony of the family members would "create a substantial danger" of impairing relationships beyond those
of the plaintiff and Defendant (R. 528), the Trial court
coerced, in every sense contrary to that concern, a proffer
of proof in open court respecting the anticipated testimony (R. 528-531)-:---oefendant's counsel requested, at the
outset of the trial, in chambers, that the testimony of
the three witnesses be taken out of the presence of the
parties, asserting that practice in the Third District had
permitted such an exclusion on a prior occasion.
15. The discussion concerning the testimony of the excluded witnesses is on the record at pages 522 through
535, and the plaintiff's proffer of proof for Mrs. George
begins at page 531.

(I
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i

August 3,

1977, and ch& Plaintiff rested,

( ?. ·

·-Vi~,

4G:

sometime in tl1e afternoon on C.!Onday, M.uc;usi 8, Ll~~

°'
I

some three and one-half days of tria1. 16

... ~ -

T~;0 Defcr.da:.:

direct case began on ~onday afternoon and was concl~d~
the early afternoon on Tuesday, August 9,

taking one i~.

The Plaintiff called a rebuttal witness on Wednesday,
August 9, and August 10, was reserved in its entiretc'· ...
argument and plaintiff's testimony on attorney's fees.
The most cursory analysis of Rule 45 should
serve to indicate that its provisions were not
applied in this instance.

proper~

The admission of such testimo;

could not "unfairly or harmfully" surprise the plaintif:.
The intention of the Defendant to call such witnesses was
disclosed to the plaintiff in Defendant's Answers to
plaintiff's Interrogatories filed with the court rou~~
five months in advance of the trial (Pleadings, R. 37).
NO one could claim that the testimony of the excluded w::nesses,

in a trial to the court sitting without a jury,

created any substantial danger of undue prejudice or of
confusing the issues,

or of misleading any jury.

rt

can

scarcely be argued in a case of such importance, that the

16.
The Defendant concedes thac the cross-exaroin~t~on of
the plaintiff, and of the financial witness, franK ~·
stuart, was substantial.

-34-
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2 :<pec:ed

:cs~l~

::o cake

11

'is mi-nutes to an hour

11

in :he undue consumption of time.

~~=~esses wcr~

r~lated

(R. 531), would

The fact that the

by blood or marriage, or by birth,

:o s:1e ?a::: ties, was not an element for consideration under
the rule, and constituted no reason for invoking a rule of
exclusion under the circumstances of this case.
The Trial Court initiated the challenge to the
:estimony of ;qrs. George, on its own motion (R. 522).

rts

action in refusing to permit independent testimony relative
co marital fault or misconduct was, counsel avers, predicated upon a misconception of the applicable law.17
The witnesses were prepared to testify, contrary
co expectations, in favor of a relative by marriage and
in opposition to a relative by blood.
~as

an inherent kind of authenticity.

18

such testimony
rt was legal error

for the Trial court, in exercising its control over the
:1ow of evidence,
of the facts,

to

depriv~

the Trial court, as the finder

from hearing and considering such testimony.

That is particularly true where, as here, the fact finder
is to determine where the truth lies as between principals

17.

See legal discussion, this Brief, Point I.

18.

With the exception of Arlette Rukavina who was the
daughter of the plaintiff and the Defendant.

~atJral
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who are partisan regarding facts that are ~ontr
~

such determinations are difficult at best
has frequentl:/ recognized,

'

averted.

as th'

is Cour:

" ... because judqcs, being huwa·

ca!'not pcnctr.:lte the family drama with complete understanding. "19
So long as facts testified to by a party are r.o:
conclusively established or admitted,

they are open to

further proof, and it is error to exclude evidence on t~
ground that it is cumulative.

Evans v. Industrial Acciden:

commission 71 cal. App 2d 244, 162 P.2d 488, Conlee v.
Taylor 153 Tenn. 507,

285 s.w. 35, 48 ALR 940, Traders

General Insurance company v. Russell

s.w.

2d 1079.

a~

(Tex. Civ. App.) 99

rt is generally held that the erroneous

exclusion of evidence affects a substantial right requirir.;
reversal if the evidence in question related to a material
point in issue, seneris v. Haas 45 cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d
915,

53 ALR 2d 124, and that it may not be disregarded by

an appellate court even though it may approve of the verdiet.

people v. Alex 260 N.Y. 425, 183 N.E. 906, 85 ALR

939.
The Defendant was entitled to present his wit·
nesses,

the admission of whose testimony would have added

19.
Alldredge v. Alldredge 119 Utah 504,
34 ALR 2d 305.

229 p.2d 681,
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materially to the weight and clarity of the evidence.

The

power of the Court to c~ntrol the introduction of evidence
at a civil trial must be exercised cautiously and so as
not to impair the rights of the parties.

The court must

exercise a sounu judicial discretion in the context of the
special circumstances of the particular case.

The exclu-

sion, in this case, of all independent testimony of marital fault or misconduct, and of other substantive matters
known to these primary witnesses, was arbitrary and unreasonably

r~strictive.

The exclusion of the preferred testimony resulted
from a misunderstanding and misapplication of the law.

It

was an abuse of discretion and constituted, where the
Defendant was concerned, a manifest injustice.

Those are

grounds, under long established principles of our law, for
the modification or reversal, on appeal, of the Trial court's
findings.

watson v. watson (Utah, 1977) 561 p.2d 1072,

Harding v. Harding 26 Utah 2d 277, 488 P.2d 308, Martinett v.
Martinett 8 Utah 2d 202,

331 p.2d 821.
POINT III

THE DECREE WAS INEQUITABLE AND REQUIRES REVISION
A.

The Allocation of the property and the Award

of Alimony in the proceedings Below was out of Proportion
to the Wife's Contribution to the Accumulation of the
Marital Estate.
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The Plaintiff told the Defendant t'nat she was
"a very expensive 1vomar.-" and admitted that

h
s e had said

that the only thing she knew how to do was spen d monGy
(R.

168).

During the period when the estate of the par~:,,

was essentially accumulated,
unemployed.

the Plaintiff was totallv

The maximum rate of pay the Plaintiff ev~

received from any employment was $2. 05 per hour (R. 224).
The Plaintiff had household help for ten or twelve years,
in fact as early as 1964 or 1965,
for the duplex on Cortez Street

to assist her in caring

(R. 214).

From early 1969

t i l l sept ember of 1976, and to January of 1977, when she
moved to california,
216)

the Plaintiff stayed at home, (R. 2li,

as previously described.

During that period of

ti~

there were incidents at cortez which operated to frustrate
the Defendant's business efforts,
ish his resources,

to occupy his time, dim1:.·

and to impede and frustrate the acquisi·

tion of the estate.
The plaintiff brought essentially nothing to the
marriage,
skills

neither property nor educational or employment

(R. 173-175).

she was able, physically, to attack

Mrs. Morecraft, a much younger woman, at the airport.
has, presently, no serious physical impediments.

she

The

plaintiff had a single child, Mrs. Rukavina,

the prospec·

tive witness, who was long ago emancipate d .

T he plaintiif

has not managed her own home or handled the household
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Jccounts ~nd has diminisheJ the parties estate,
spending habits, and

b~

through her

her misconduct.

The allowance of permanent alimo0y normally presumes that the wife assisted in the accumulation of the
property and that she should receive a just proportion of
what she has helped to earn, and that alimony should not
be awarded where she did not materially assist her husband
in the home or out.

N.W. 907.

see:

Wilkins v. Wilkins 84 Neb. 206, 120

Annotation:

34 ALR 2d 337, section 8.

This court in the early case of Blair v. Blair 40 utah 306,
121 p. 19, determined that the size and productiveness of
the estate of the husband, while an important factor in
determining the amount of the allowance, must not be considered without reference to whether or not the wife was
of assistance to him in accumulating the property.
rt was precisely during the years of the Plaintiff's dormancy,

that the Defendant changed from an employee

working for others, to the owner of his own business, bidding on jobs and substantially increasing his net worth.
The Plaintiff has been a hindrance, rather than an aid, in
the accumulation of the assets which the Trial court distributed in allocating the property.

The estate was

accumulated by the diligence of the Defendant in spite of
the Plaintiff's habits,

in the face of her instability and

despite her lack of industry and thrift.
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Divorce proceedi11gs are in equity and this Couc,
on appeal,

can review

q~estions

of both law and

King v. King 25 Utah 2d 163, 478 p.2d 492.

fact.

l\ 1 though the

judgment of the 'l'riul court will not- b e d.isturbcd light!;,
this Court may review the evidence, make its own find·in gs
and substitute .its judgment for that of the Trial court
when justice requires.

Harding v. Harding 26 utah 2d 277 ,

488 P. 2d 308, Dearden v. Dearden 15 utah 2d 105, 388 P.ld
230, Martinett v. Martinett B utah 2d 202, 331 p.2d 821,
Wilson v. Wilson 5 utah 2d 79,
B.

296 P.2d 977.

The Distribution of the Property as ordered

by the Trial court Made the Present Award of substantial
permanent Alimony unnecessary.
The Trial court awarded the plaintiff assets tha:
plaintiff's own counsel valued at $197,500.00,

20

without

including the household furniture and furnishings in carmel,
California,

the miscellaneous personal property included lr.

Exhibit 25-p, attorneys fees of $8,000.00 (R. 132) or court
costs in the amount of $298. 70.

The award included a

savings certificate in the amount of $25, 000. 00 at the
Silver King state Bank in park City, Utah, which was fully
encumbered.and it required that the Defendant whose
liquidity and prospects were described upon the record

20.

Exhibit 66-P
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~

considerable detail,

should "forthwith" make all arrange-

ments required to release the encumbrances against the
~crtificatc
aw~~dcd

(lz.

131).

The Defendant, valurd the property

to the Plaintiff, in the provisions of the Decree,

at very close to $213,800.00, including the attorneys fees
and costs. 21
The parties had

acqui~ed

the home in carmel,

california, only slightly more than a year prior to their
separation.

It cost $130,000.00, originally, and was valued

at $167,500.00, when the case was tried (R. 600.

see also:

plaintiff's Exhibit 55-p) and its value, of course, continues to increase.
carmel property.

There is no encumbrance against the

The home in carmel was awarded to the

plaintiff and the duplex on Cortez Street was awarded to
the Defendant

(R. 131).

In addition, then, to the award of

over $200,000.00 in property to the plaintiff, the court
granted the Plaintiff, presumably as a substitute for a
right of support, alimony in the sum of $1,400.00 per month,
which projected over a fifteen year period, less than the
life expectancy of the Plaintiff, amounts to an additional
$252,000.00.

In that regard,

justice to the Defendant,

21.

the oecree works such an in-

that equity and conscience demand

Exhibit 34-D.
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that it be revised.
263,

Christensen v. Chris~ensen 2l

444 p.2d 511.
The question whether permanent alimony shoub

allowed must consi::ler the underlying necessities of tne
wife and the financial ability of the husband.
income,

The wife':

and counsel suggests her prospective income, fro:.

her separate estate,

is always a factor in determini~~

allowance of alimony and may constitute an absolute b~
where it is amply sufficient to maintain her in that pos:tion in life to which she has been accustomed.
Miles 185 Or.

230,

~·

202 P.2d 485.

If one subtracted from,

say,

$200,000.00, the

conservative value of t.he court's property award to the
plaintiff,

the sum of $36,350.00,

the net equity in the

parties long term home at 692 Cortez Street in Salt Lake
City, utah,
$163,650.00.

the plaintiff would retain a cash balance oi
That is to say that if the plaintiff put

H

another home a value equivalent to the value of the home::
which she and the Defendant had,
of the marriage,
easily,

lived,

essentially, for the per:::

she could free up,

in excess of $150,000.00.

or make liquid,

That equation does not

consider the increased value of the carmel home, and must
be considered conservative.
At 7 1/2%, a normal trus•~ r, ..

c• ,

such a fund

would produce without touching the principal,
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for the

plaintiff, $11, 250.00 annually, or at 8%, $12,000.00, or
at 10'.'0, $15,000.00.
In MacDonald v. Macoonald 120 Utah 573,
1066,

236 p.2d

the parties had been married for 29 years, about the

same time as the parties on this appeal.
child, an adult, as do these parties.

They had one

The problem of the

wife in MacDonald was not drugs and emotional instability,
as here, but rather intoxicating liquor and emotional
instability.

Where the drinking had gone to such an excess

as to present a considerable family problem, where as
Justice Crockett said, there was nothing for the court to
do except to recognize the failure and "pronounce a benediction on the wreck," the Trial court awarded only nominal
alimony and this court with its extensive scope of review,
affirmed.
The court held that the cash awarded to the wife,
though in that case her own, was "properly taken in account
in appraising the entire financial situation of the parties
and adjusting their property rights."
stances,

under those circum-

this court said, based as they were upon the condi-

tions which existed at the time of the divorce there was
no necessity that the wife be paid substantial alimony
immediately.

There is no such necessity in the instant case.

Although in Macoonald the court is affirming what a Trial
Court had earlier done, in contradiction to the ~ituation
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here,

the underlying equitable considerations remain•'.
'-!'.';:

same.

MacDonald stands for the proposition that th

e Tr1a

court must take into account the resources of the wife,
including the property awarded to her in the divorce
ceeding,

Pro-

in determining the liability for alimony.
rn Dubois v. Dubois 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d lle:

(1973),

the Trial court took into account the source of::,

assets which comprised the marital estate and also the
fact that the Plaintiff wife was,

unlike our case, without

fault in the termination of the marriage.
court said,

"However, " th10

"it appears that the income from the assets

awarded to the plaintiff is sufficient to maintain her

i~

the manner to which she is accustomed without periodic pay·
men ts from the Defendant."

The court permitted the alimo::

to be modified to reduce the payments to the sum of $1.00
per year.

rn that case,

there was a 30 year marriage, two

children were over 21 years of age and the Defendant hu~
band had informed his wife that he was in love with another
woman.
At 7 1/2°/o, a normal trust return,

the sum of

$150,000.00 paid at the rate of $1,400.00 per month

w~~

last the plaintiff, without any additional assistance from
the Defendant, for fourteen years an d ten man t

hs

-

The sum

of $175,000.00 would pay $1.400.00 per month for over twe.:
years.
would,

·
t
At a higher rate of interes ,

the t;me of paymc"t
~

of course, be increased.
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c.

The Award of Alimony was Inequitable.
Febru~ry,

In
proceedings

b~fore

~977,

during the pendency of these

the Trial court,

the Plaintiff was

arrested and incarcerated on the felony charge in carmel,
california, which involved the theft of jewelry from her
carmel neighbors.

The Defendant, who was called by the

plaintiff, who was in jail, travelled to California with
Mrs. Hasoppe,
assist her

the mother of the Plaintiff, in an effort to

(R. 459).

of the plaintiff,

On that occasion, after the release

the Defendant became suspicious, he

testified, of the relationship between his then estranged
and separated wife and a deputy sheriff in Monterey county,
named Wilbur House,

(R. 459) who the plaintiff admitted she

had first met as early as Memorial oay 1975, approximately
the same time the carmel home was purchased (R. 284).
The Defendant travelled a second time to carmel,
California, in April of 1977 (R. 458), while the Plaintiff
was in utah in connection with these proceedings.

He

entered the carmel home and found a message on the kitchen
telephone to Mr. House, written presumably by a gardener,·

Mr. Arriola (R. 461).

Another message was found on the

telephone in a bedroom that had been converted to a TV
room, written by Mrs. Gramme, who testified it was for
the gardener (R. 289).

rt is in evidence as Defendant's

Exhibit 35-o.
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On the occasion of the April visit,

the Defonda:.

found mens clothing in the bedroom closet which included
four suits,
sweater,

a pair of gray slacks,

two wool'-"n golf shirts,

ties and underwear

(R. 462).

two sports outfits, a

some dress shirts, socks,

The Defendant estimated the

value of the clothing at six to eight hundred dollars
(R. 463, 464)

and took as evidence,

the gray corduroy sui:,

which was tailored and had been worn, one or two of the go~'
shirts,

the ties, socks and underwear.

The other items

clothing were left in the home (R. 463, 464) .

o:

The Trial

court refused the admission of the i-t:ems of clothing in
evidence

(R. 470, 471),

d~tail

some

22

although they were described in

by the Defendant on the record (R. 463).

T~

plaintiff admitted there was clothing in the home, but
claimed that it was new clothing and that it had never bm
worn.

rt was,

she said,

hang me with it ... "
one suit,
(R.

286).

"I guess, my mistake, because you

(R. 286).

four shirts,

Mrs. Gramme admitted, that

two ties and some socks were taken

The plaintiff admitted only the items of mens

clothing she knew to be in the Defendant's physical posses·
sion and conceded that they belonged to Mr. House (R. 2SS).
The Defendant testified there were many other items, incld·
ing three suits,

that were left behind (R. 463).

The

22.
And also refused the admission of a letter that made
reference to Mr. House (R. 290-293).
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-plaintiff's explanation of these events is on the record
at 286, 287.
Mrs. cranunc, who admitted that hor sole source
of income was

th~

from the oefendant

temporary alimony payment she received
(R.

296), admitted that she had spent

$125.00 or $126.00 on clothing for Mr. House (R. 287) and
the record showed that between March 19 and May 23, 1977,
she had written to a store called Bruhns, where the clothes
for Mr. House were purchased, ten checks totalling $980.14
(R. 294).

She claimed that the greater part of the pur-

chases were for herself.
The plaintiff also admitted that she had given
Mr. House,

in addition to the clothing, over essentially

the same time period, checks in the total amount of $800.00
which, she claimed, were for services the deputy sheriff
performed in and around the Carmel home, and for goods
furnished for the home (R. 287, 288).
When Mr. Gramme arrived, he found that Mr. House,
who was married and whose wife,

the Plaintiff testified,

had terminal cancer (R. 285), had control of the keys to
his boat and possession of his tools which had been removed
from the garage of the carmel home (R. 465, 466).

Dis-

cussions with Mrs. House, and one with Mr. House at the
marina are detailed in the record beginning at page 465.
Barely 45 minutes after the conversation at the marina with
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Mr. House,

the Defendant returned to the carmel h

ome 1vhers

he found that the mens clothes not previously taken had
been removed,
(R.

466,

along with the note on the kitchen tel

h
ep onE

467).

After a divorce is granted, it is clear that the
affections of the parties may rest and re P os e wliere they
will.

one thing,

however, is certain.

The Defendant has

never had an obligation to support, in any fashion, anyone
other than the Plaintiff, or to provide any third p~~
with cash and clothing,

to'ols, a boat and access to a

$170,000.00 home.
rt is inequitable to require that the Defendant
furnish such assistance, especially, where the wife has
been provided in the allocation of the marital estate,

~tl

resources sufficient for her own support.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
section 30-3-3 u.c.A.
the wife,

cc::

1953, permits an award to

or to a husband, of money with which to prosecute,

or defend, an action in divorce.

The Statute, this court

has said, does not contemplate that the award for expenses
of the litigation should be made only in those cases where
the adverse party,

usually the wife,

is destitute or

practically so, but rather when, in the sound discretion
of the court,

the circumstances of the parties are such
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that in fairness to the wife she should be given financial
assistance by the
of the action.

husb~nd

sec:

in her prosecution or defense

Weiss v. Weiss 111 utah 353, 179 P.2d

1005.

The financial circumstances of the parties have
an important bearing on issues relative to attorneys fees
and suit money, and are critical to the determination of
the amount of, or the necessity for,

their award.

"The reason for permitting a wife
suit money to defend an action for
divorce rests on the ground that the
wife normally has no separate estate
from which to pay for bringing or
defending the action. This is the
situation in the case at hand." Alldredge v.
Alldredge 119 Utah 504, 229 p.2d 681.
(Emphasis supplied)
Not to allow the wife expenses and counsel fees,
Justice Wolfe said, would in the majority of cases work
an injustice by deny.ing her the power to enforce any
marital rights she might have.

In the instant case, how-

ever, the normal situation does not apply.

The wife was

not only granted $8,000.00 in attorneys fees,

together

with costs of approximately $300.00, but was given, at the
same time, as her sole and separate estate, real and
personal property worth in excess of $200,000.00, and
increasing in value.
under circumstances where the wife did not
require,

"in fairness, " the financial assistance of the
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husband to insure the efficient presentation
of the controversy,

o

f

her Sid,

this court has said,

"We L!l:.;o believe thuL the cvLdcnce shows Lhilt the Pluint~ff hus a
suffici0nt income from property owned
by her to justify the court's ruling
that defendant should not be required
to pay her attorney fees and costs in
these proceedings." Callister v.
Callister 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 p.2d 944.
There was no necessity for the award of fees
and costs under the circumstances of this case, and it
is not equitable that the Defendant should be required
to pay them from his share of the marital estate.
Beyond,
raised above,

however,

the economic considerations

this court has previously considered the

implications of misconduct on attorney's fees and costs.
"Here (concerning suit money), as
in the case of alimony, gross or irrunoral
conduct rna1 cause a denial of attorney
fees, ..... 2
Alldredge, supra at 687.
CONCLUSION
The Trial court was obliged to render an equit·
able adjustment of the economic resources of the parties,
and to help them reconstruct their li•Jes on a happy and

23.
"Most jurisdictions" provide that the court ma~
deny suit money to a wife who is guilty of matrimonial
misconduct sufficient to authorize the husband to sue
31 3
for a divorce or separation.
Annotation:
2 ALR 2d
'
section 3.
see also:
24 Arn Jur 2d, "Divorce and
separation," section 596, p. 720.

-50-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

useful basis.

In doing so, however, it was necessary for

the court to consider relative guilt or innocence.
The Trial court misread the flexible standard
established by tliis court, and misapplied the law.

rt is

true that many of the elements to be considered in making
an award of alimony are of economic character.
erroneous to assume,
were exclusive.

rt was

however, that the economic elements

The award was an injustice to the Defend-

ant who is both a casualty of the plaintiff's conduct, which
made the continuation of the marriage irnpossible, 24 and a
victim of social engineering.
The plaintiff, as a condition of the divorce,
acquired an estate worth approximately $200,000.00, far in
excess of the plaintiff's contributions, personal or
financial,

to the accumulation of the estate, and an ex-

pectancy of several hundred thousand more.

The allocation

of the property and the plaintiff's economic independence
made the award of permanent alimony unnecessary.

rt is

inconceivable that the plaintiff, who spent virtually her
entire married life in a duplex that cost less than
$10,000.00 initially to build, should now reside in a
home that was, at the time of the trial, worth $170,000.00,
on which the taxes and insurance are approximately

24.

And his own conduct predictable.
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$3,000.00 per year.

It is entirely improbable tha.t a

son with the Plaintiff'

:5

per.

emotional and financial histor"

,,

can successfully manage such an estate without assistance. 25

rn orde.c to avoid economic dependence or the

misuse of assets,

the wise and efficient management of

the Plaintiff's substantial estate, under the circumstanceo
of this case,

is an utter necessity.

The assets, if

liquidated and wisely managed, are adequate and

suff~~m

for the Plaintiff's needs.

The home in carmel should be

sold and another acquired.

The proceeds should be placed

in trust for the benefit of a Plaintiff who is both vulnerable, and psychologically unstable.
This court should eliminate altogether, or sub·
st an tially reduce,

the alimony award.

It should order

the sale of the carmel home and require that the liquidatE·i
proceeds be professionally managed for the plaintiff's
benefit, and protection.

The court should diminish ~e

property award to the extent of the savings certificate,
$ 25, 000. 00, which is encumbered, and require the plaintiff

25.
see Defendant's Final Argument, at 627 to 629, for
a discussion of the considerations involved here.
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to pay from her court awarded share of the marital estate,
her own attorneys fees

~nd

costs.
Respectfully submitted,

JOEL M. ALLRED
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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